The O-Ring theory is used to analyze the emergence of¯rms organized as partnerships. The owner-managers of such entrepreneurial rms bene¯t from ability matching within their production teams. However, they must bear the project risk. Risk-aversion then induces a second-best solution. Integrated¯rms managed on behalf of riskneutral residual-claimants face information and/or enforcement problems. Hence, they cannot organize ability-matched teams. There exists an equilibrium such that groups of individuals sharing a superior ability level will found entrepreneurial¯rms. Low-quality individuals will be employed by managed¯rms which hire randomly. JEL-Classi¯cation: D2, L2, M2.
emphasizes the function of the entrepreneur to implement "new combinations". Beginning with Cooper and Bruno [1977] and Cooper [1985] , a number of authors have then already focussed on the "incubator" role of the place of employment prior to founding a new¯rm. In this respect, the recent emergence of the so-called "New Economy" -typically referring to¯rm foundations in the computer, information and communications, and bio-technology industries -appears to provide a prime example.
Hence, according to Bhid ¶ e's [2000, 54] survey of the 1989 Inc. 500 companies, 71% of the respective start-ups are founded by individuals who "replicated or modi¯ed an idea encountered during their previous employment". Superior technological knowledge can therefore not explain the emergence of such new¯rms. Yet, Zingales [2000, 2001a] emphasize that the nature of the "new combinations" has changed. In particular, the new technologies induce a fundamental shift of power from¯nancial to human capital. The innovations originate from human capital rather than from inanimate assets. Thus, the allocation of the decision rights within the¯rm becomes the prime issue. Corporate venturing for new opportunities then results in a subdivision of the corporate physical assets.
Following the same basic argument, Baily and Lawrence [2001] conclude that the emergence of the "New Economy" re°ects outsourcing decisions of human capital-intensive productions. Bhid ¶ e [2000, 94] observes that such spin-o®s are typically led by former high-pro¯le employees. Hence, 83% of the founders in his survey at least hold a four-year college degree. While¯nancial innovations have made this development possible, the recent experience of¯nancial volatility now adversely a®ects the "New Economy"
rms (Baily and Lawrence [2001] ). Reintegration constitutes a means to overcome these problems. Moreover, according to Holmstr¿m and Kaplan [2001] , the process of disintegration generally terminates once the critical assets have been identi¯ed. Reintegration via mergers and acquisitions then follows again. Thus, even successful spin-o®s are viewed as transitory phenomena.
Yet, there exist limits to vertical control associated with (re-)integration. Prat [2002] shows that°at hierarchies with ability-matched teams are dominant in production environments characterized by positive complementarities between specialized tasks. Moreover,°at hierarchies with "up-or-out"-promotion schemes for experienced managers provide "incentives [...] to protect, rather than steal, the source of organizational rents" (Rajan and Zingales [2001b, p. 805] ). The perspective to become owners themselves limits the ex-ploitation risk and, therefore, enhances the incentives to specialize for young managers. Then, Bhid ¶ e [2000, 139-140, 367-368] again reports the particular importance of such team work in corporate ventures.
The two examples provided by Prat [2002] further demonstrate the pivotal role of adequate recruiting. In fact, "unusual judgement or perceptiveness" in employee selection characterizes the successful entrepreneur (Bhid ¶ e [2000, p. 108] ). Case studies show that -during the growth phase following the immediate start-up period -recruiting experienced managers from established¯rms constitutes a key success factor (Bhid ¶ e [2000, 282-288] ). At the same time, corporate policies in well-established¯rms to "recruit individuals who will¯t their culture and norms to promote cooperation and team work [...] limit their ability to employ the best individual for a given task [...] " (Bhid ¶ e [2000, 324] ). Hence, entrepreneurial spin-o®s constitute a persistent response to the established corporations' failure in organizing team-work in human capital-intensive industries.
Within the new spin-o®s, stock ownership or stock option plans then serve as selection devices (Bhid ¶ e [2000, 87, 200] ). Rajan and Zingales [2001b, 832] add that ownership must be wide-spread throughout these new rms. Concentrated control rights would again increase the threat of expropriation for new team members. Thus, the incentives to specialize would be reduced. According to Audretsch and Thurik [2001] , ownership-like management incentive schemes characterize "entrepreneurial"¯rms. Further, the change from "managed" to "entrepreneurial"¯rms constitutes the single most important characteristic associated with the emergence of the "New Economy". In fact, the past two decades have witnessed a signi¯cant increase in managerial stock ownership (Holderness et al. [1999] ).
Following the Knightian view of entrepreneurship, Laffont [1979, 1983] already demonstrate the existence of a contract equilibrium. Less risk-averse individuals become risk-taking entrepreneurs who provide insurance for their more risk-averse employees. Yet, the recent experience of "New Economy" spin-o®s sheds doubts on the self-selection of individuals as entrepreneurs, respectively employees according to their degree of risk-aversion. Thus, the increased necessity to compensate poor employee stock performance in cash has induced additional¯nancial problems for the "New Economy"¯rms (Zingheim and Schuster [2000] ). Moreover, this development gives rise to motivation problems for the managerowners who formerly received preferential treatment as high-potential employees (Weinberg [2001] ). Hence, partnership-like incentive schemes limit the scope of spin-o®s. Individuals who -either as high-pro¯le employees in established corporations, or as potential entrepreneurs -are equally risk-averse will demand a compensating risk-premium in order to join a¯rm in which incentives are provided via ownership.
The current study focuses on the trade-o® between the bene¯ts of abilitymatching and the costs of partnership-like compensation schemes in entrepreneurial spin-o®s. It applies the O-Ring production theory introduced by Kremer [1993] 1 . On¯rst sight, the O-Ring theory only constitutes a particular example of positive complementarities in organizing team-work. Yet, while previous work has focussed on the relationship between asset complementarity and the internal organization of¯rms, the current study analyzes entrepreneurial activity in terms of a labor market equilibrium. It is therefore more closely related to Gromb and Scharfstein [2002] and Landier [2001] . However, both studies analyze informational equilibria. Failed¯rm founders are not stigmatized whereas project failure within a¯rm provides an informative signal concerning employee quality. In contrast, the O-Ring framework identi¯es individual abilities with probabilities of failing in taskperformance. Thus, the bene¯ts of ability-matching are directly linked to reductions in project-risk.
The remainder of the study is organized as follows. The next section introduces the basic analytical framework. Section 3 investigates the e®ects of rm organization and risk-aversion given exogenous alternative employment opportunities. It is shown that the¯rst-best solution can be implemented by partnerships of risk-neutral individuals. However, partnerships of risk-averse individuals induce ine±cient input choices. Section 4 then demonstrates the existence and characteristics of a competitive industry equilibrium with endogenous separation of entrepreneurial and managed¯rms. Matched groups of high-ability individuals found partnerships. Low-ability individuals will seek employment in managed¯rms which recruit randomly while o®ering certain income opportunities. The¯nal section summarizes and discusses the results with particular reference to the perceived "volatility" of "New Economy"¯rms.
The basic O-Ring framework
The following theoretical framework modi¯es the basic O-Ring model introduced by Kremer [1993] only marginally. Thus, consider the expected revenue function
where k refers to physical capital input and n denotes the number of tasks involved in a particular¯rm's production. For analytic convenience, the output price p is normalized to equal unity.
Further, q i 2 [q L ; q H ], with 0 < q L < q H < 1 and i = 1; :::; n, denotes the ability of the employee, respectively team member assigned to task i. Ability directly corresponds to the individual probability of perfect task performance. More precisely, if the individual assigned to task i malperforms, the team as a whole cannot produce positive output. This occurs with prob-
. Further, the probability q i constitutes an individual characteristic of the particular team member assigned to task i.
Thus, (1) re°ects a typical team production function. The output of the team depends on the performance of each team member. In fact, given the O-Ring framework, the productivity of the team is always governed by the lowest-quality employee hired. Only the fact that output is completely destroyed upon malperformance of a single team member may be considered as an extreme assumption. This approach therefore constitutes a particular variant of the positive complementarities in production discussed by Prat [2002] 2 . Intuitively, F (k; n) then de¯nes output per team member given that all members perform perfectly. It increases with physical capital employed and the number of tasks involved in production. Hence, increasing n implies a technological change towards the production of a more sophisticated variant of the industry's good, or service. For convenience, let ) in the following. Spin-o®s typically produce services which replace a formerly integrated production. Thus, new bio-technology¯rms often constitute R&D spin-o®s founded and controlled by former employees of a pharmaceutical¯rm. Also, "New Economy" ICT¯rms customize standard accounting software, prepare Internet presentations, or optimize server-client networks for "Old Economy" rms. In principle these services can be -and, in less sophisticated variants, are still -produced in integrated¯rms as well.
The analysis therefore considers a particular labor market for professional specialists. In equilibrium, they are either employees of integrated¯rms, or partners in entrepreneurial spin-o®s. For simplicity, abilities are distributed uniformly over the interval [q L ; q H ]. Thus, N (q) = ¹ n = 0 members of the pool of professionals share the ability q. The analysis abstracts from explicitly considering the labor-leisure trade-o®. Given voluntary participation, all individuals supply one unit of labor inelastically.
Throughout the analysis draws on the following concept of a competitive industry equilibrium:
De¯nition. If the competition of¯rms for professionals of di®erent quality induces an allocation such that a) the residual expected pro¯t in all expected pro¯t-maximizing¯rms equals zero, b) and all individuals of a given quality q 2 [q L ; q H ] obtain an identical expected utility level either as members of a partnership maximizing the expected utility of their partners, or being employed by an expected pro¯t-maximizing¯rm, this allocation is said to constitute a competitive industry equilibrium. Given that the two types of¯rms -partnerships and expected pro¯t-maximizing¯rms -coexist, a separating competitive industry equilibrium must further satisfy that c) (i) no current member of a partnership prefers to be employed by an expected pro¯t-maximizing¯rm, and (ii) no group of current employees of expected pro¯t-maximizing¯rms prefers to found a new partnership.
The next section serves to prepare the equilibrium analysis by investigating the optimal input decisions associated with¯rm type. Only for this purpose, let V = 0 then denote an exogenous reservation income associated with alternative employment. Also, all¯rms are able to select individual workers to organize their production teams. Thus, abilities are publicly observable and the¯rms' recruitment decisions can be perfectly enforced. These assumptions allow to isolate the e®ects of¯rm organization and risk-aversion on the e±ciency of input choices. They will be removed in section 4. The separating reservation income is then determined endogenously in labor market equilibrium.
3 Firm organization and risk-aversion
Expected pro¯t-maximizing¯rms
In order to construct a benchmark case for further analysis, consider the standard expected pro¯t-maximizing¯rm. Its residual claimant solves
where w(q i ), with i = 1; ::; n, denotes the wage income o®ered to the employee assigned to task i. The expression fq i g then refers to the ability-pro¯le of the¯rm. Also, r is the rental rate of capital in a perfectly competitive capital market.
It can now be shown:
Proposition 1 Suppose the reservation wage V is su±ciently low to allow for positive production. Also, there exist only expected pro¯t-maximizing¯rms in the industry.
(a) Then, with observable individual abilities, there exists a competitive industry equilibrium such that all¯rms employ a single ability-type only. Moreover, the corresponding identical ability level of the team members determines a unique optimal team size and capital input level for each¯rm. The optimal team size increases in the team members' identical ability level. The shares of revenue devoted to repaying capital and rewarding labor are given by the production elasticities ®, respectively (1 ¡ ®).
(b) The allocation implemented by the competitive industry equilibrium is e±cient.
Proof. To begin with, note that, given (2), an expected pro¯t-maximizinḡ rm will not be induced to change its current ability pro¯le, if
Now, assume that, in equilibrium,¯rms employ a single ability-type only. The expected pro¯t of a¯rm hiring employees of ability q can then be obtained as
If an interior optimum exists, it is characterized by the¯rst-order conditions
Given that only expected pro¯t-maximizing¯rms exist in equilibrium, condition b) of the de¯nition of the competitive industry equilibrium requires the existence of a wage-schedule which unambiguously assigns a wagepayment w(q) to all individuals of ability q. If production teams are homogeneous, the optimality of the recruiting decisions according to (3) implies that this schedule must satisfy
Then, if the¯rms' equilibrium choices of capital input and team size actually satisfy the¯rst-order conditions (5) and (6), rearranging condition (5) reveals that
with superscripts "¤" indicating optimal values. Inserting from (8) into (7) yields
The constant of integration c must equal zero. In the limit q = q L ! 0, it re°ects the wage o®ered when organizing teams consisting of professionals with zero quality. However, such teams would produce zero output with certainty. Thus, they cannot o®er positive wage-income.
With c = 0, (9) then implies
. This proves that the total wage-bill in each¯rm equals the share (1 ¡ ®) of revenue. Moreover, according to (5), the rental payment for capital rk ¤ amounts to the share ® of revenue in each of these¯rms. Thus, as required by condition a) of the de¯nition of a competitive industry equilibrium, residual expected pro¯ts equal zero.
Further, inserting from (10) into (6) implies
Thus, the optimal team size is increasing in the ability level of the team members. Interpreting this result, note that the function nq n attains a unique maximum for 1 n ¤ = ¡ log(q). Next, investigating the second-order conditions for the¯rm's optimization problem, reveals that
upon utilizing (11) and (5). Thus,
Given the proposed characterization of the industry equilibrium, (n ¤ ; k ¤ ) thus constitute unique optimal choices for¯rms employing homogeneous teams consisting of type-q individuals.
Production will actually take place in¯rms characterized by team ability q such that
By virtue of (9) w ¤ (q) is monotonically increasing in q. Hence, positive production in this industry can be assured by assuming
= Vcharacterizes the competitive labor market equilibrium. All professionals exhibiting abilities q = q ¤ will be employed in the industry, while individuals of quality q < q ¤ will prefer the alternative employment. So far, it has still be assumed that, in the competitive industry equilibrium, the¯rms select teams which are homogeneous with respect to the team members' abilities. However, note that the increasing wage-schedule derived in (9) now also implies that (3) actually characterizes an optimal choice of the i ¡ th team member's ability level.
Intuitively, since the LHS of (3) is monotonically increasing in h Q j6 =i q j i , rms which have hired the highest-quality employees for the¯rst (n ¡ 1) tasks, will always bid most in order to¯ll the n-th position in the team. This implies that a¯rm which has decided to recruit the top-quality employee for one task will recruit only such top-qualities for all tasks.
Similarly, a¯rm which has decided to begin hiring by recruiting some medium-quality professional cannot successfully compete for higher-quality individuals when¯lling other positions. However, it will succeed in attracting other employees of the same quality when competing with¯rms which have started hiring lower-quality employees.
Thus, given the wage schedule w ¤ (q) provided in (9), the¯rms' optimal recruitment decisions described by (3) imply that each¯rm will employ a single ability type only. Then, (n ¤ (q); k ¤ (q)) as characterized by (8) and (11) constitute the corresponding unique expected pro¯t-maximizing choices in ¯rms with teams consisting of individuals with identical ability q. Hence, the competitive industry equilibrium introduced in part a) of Proposition 1 exists.
For expositional reasons, the proof that this equilibrium implements an e±cient allocation is relegated to the Appendix.
Obviously, the e±ciency-property of this competitive equilibrium motivates its further use as a benchmark case. When referring to this solution, the input choices (k ¤ (q); n ¤ (q)) will be denoted¯rst-best in the following. In addition to the characteristic features noted in Proposition 1, also recall that larger teams of superior ability produce more sophisticated variants of the industry's commodity or service. Hence, there exists a multitude of¯rms o®ering services of di®erent sophistication in competitive industry equilibrium. According to (9), small di®erences in team abilities then yield rather large income di®erentials across¯rms. At the same time, there is no wage-di®erentiation within the¯rm.
Risk-neutral partnerships
Contrasting with the assumption of pro¯t maximization utilized above, spino®s typically constitute entrepreneurial¯rms. If not organized as formal partnerships, they distribute a large fraction of their economic pro¯t among their employees via stock or stock option plans. Hence, it is appropriate to assume that such¯rms are self-managed by the members of the production team. Then, given that individuals are risk-neutral, they rather maximize surplus per team member. Thus, they solve M ax (fq i g;n;k) R (fq i g ; n; k) ¡ rk n (17) Note, however, that
as well. Hence, consider two professionals each founding such a partnership¯rm and one characterized by higher ability than the other. The superior ability founder will always be able to o®er a more attractive partnership for other high-ability professionals. This remains to be true as the production teams grow by attracting even more partners. In labor market equilibrium entrepreneurial¯rms will therefore also consist of partners sharing an identical ability level.
Replacing [ Q n i=1 q i ] by q n when solving (17), di®erentiating with respect to capital k restates (5). The¯rst-order condition with respect to the number of tasks n further reveals
upon substituting from (5). Again, the optimal choice of technology yields team size n ¤ (q). Obviously, this also implies that the capital demanded by the¯rms is given by k ¤ (q). The second-order su±cient conditions can be obtained as shown in (12) to (15) above.
Recall that the total wage bill in the pro¯t maximizing case always equals the share (1 ¡ ®) of expected revenue. With risk-neutral team members, the wage for employees in such¯rms is thus equal to the expected surplus net of capital rental payments. Obviously, this exactly coincides with the individual expected income generated in an entrepreneurial¯rm. Hence, given the results above, the ability level q ¤ also satis¯es
Thus, without further proof, it follows:
Proposition 2 Again, assume that individual abilities are observable. However, suppose that there exist only¯rms organized as partnerships of riskneutral individuals in the competitive industry equilibrium. Then, this equilibrium can be characterized as derived in Proposition 1 for the case when there exist only expected pro¯t-maximizing¯rms.
Given the particular O-Ring team production function (1), this equivalence result should be obvious. Rewarding factor inputs according to their marginal revenue implies that expected residual pro¯ts equal zero. With risk-neutral individuals, the institutional structure of the¯rm only determines the means to distribute income. It does not a®ect the realized income distribution.
Further, recalling that the distribution of abilities over the pool of professionals is uniform, there exist
dq of such¯rms in industry equilibrium. Due to (11) and (19)¯rm size increases with team quality. Thus, the number of¯rms characterized by a particular team quality increases with decreasing team quality. It follows that small increases in the reservation income V induce the closing of a rather large number of¯rms in the industry 4 .
Partnerships of risk-averse individuals
Let the members of the industry's pools of professionals now be risk-averse. Hence, they maximize their expected utility. Instantaneous preferences are characterized by a utility function U (y), with U 0 (y) > 0 and U 00 (y) < 0 for incomes y > 0. Of course, assuming that there only exist managed¯rms which maximize expected pro¯ts, all results of section 3.1 can be retained. However, the manager-owners of entrepreneurial¯rms will maximize
Introducing exogenous income Y > 0 in (21), the analysis will exclusively focus on interior solutions. Such solutions can be ensured by assuming that U (y) satis¯es the usual Inada-conditions.
If it is ever bene¯cial to found such¯rms, they will consist of teams of individuals characterized by identical abilities again. This follows from the fact that @EU=@ h Q j6 =i q j i > 0 for F (k; n) > 0. Thus, high-ability individuals will always¯nd it more attractive to join partnerships already consisting of higher-quality team members in the¯rst (n¡1) tasks. Replacing
where (k;ñ) denote the respective optimal choices in this case. Substituting from (22) into (23) implies
Concavity then implies that ¡log(q)ñ < 1 (25) Thus, partnerships managed by risk-averse team members are ceteris paribus smaller than risk-neutral partnerships. Rearranging (22) it also followsk
Substituting for r from (5) above,
Recall from Proposition 1 that, for a given team ability level q, nq n is maximized by setting n = n ¤ . Thus, n ¤ q n ¤ >ñqñ, 8q 2 [q L ; q H ]. Risk-averse partners not only require an expected income su±cient to cover their share of capital costs. In addition, they must be compensated for risk associated with paying the capital rental costs even if production fails. Consequently, the cost of attracting partners is higher than in the risk-neutral case. This implies that the size of the production team falls short of maximizing the expected team output.
Also, due to decreasing marginal utilities, the last term in the RHS of (27) is greater than one. Thus, n ¤ >ñ implies (k ¤ =n ¤ ) > (k=ñ) and k ¤ >k. Let y(q) then denote the certainty equivalent income of such risk-averse partners self-managing a¯rm of team quality q. Hence,ỹ(q) = U ¡1 (EU (q;ñ;k)). De¯ningw(q) =ỹ(q) ¡ Y as the respective certainty equivalent return to participating in the partnership, it is also immediately clear that
The second inequality follows from the allocative distortions associated with maximizing expected utility.
Finally, note that
for all q > 0. Again, assume that there exists q =q 2 [q L ; q H [ such that EU (q;ñ(q);k(q)) = U (Y + V ). Then, production will take place. However, only individuals of ability q =q will actually found entrepreneurial¯rms. The inequalities (28) then yieldq > q ¤ . Summarizing the analysis, it therefore follows: Proposition 3 Ceteris paribus, risk-aversion induces less¯rms founded as partnerships in competitive industry equilibrium. The¯rms actually founded produce less sophisticated services with ine±ciently small teams. Moreover, capital input and capital per team member is ine±ciently low.
Else, the equilibrium with risk-averse partnerships shares the properties derived above already. Small variations in team quality again induce large expected income di®erentials between the partnerships. Also, a small increase in the relative attractiveness of alternative jobs induces a rather large reduction of the number of¯rms in the industry. Due to smaller¯rm sizes, the latter e®ect is even reinforced by introducing risk-aversion.
Endogenous separation of managed and entrepreneurial¯rms
Given that the industry technology constitutes public knowledge, the ine±-ciencies associated with risk-averse partnerships appear to preclude the emergence of competitive entrepreneurial¯rms. However, this conclusion requires that¯rm managements are always equally quali¯ed to verify the di®erent professionals' abilities. According to the O-Ring theory, successful production requires the coordination of -typically, complex and human capital-intensivetasks and cooperation within the team. Given this production environment, the veri¯cation of the team members' abilities will plausibly be enhanced if the evaluation is carried out by the team members themselves.
Yet, even if veri¯cation is in principle possible, it is necessary to provide incentives to specialize on this task. In entrepreneurial¯rms the motivation to select appropriately is directly linked to the manager-owners' residual income claims. In contrast, wage-incentives for specialized human resource managers in large corporations cannot draw on direct measures of their recruitment success. Moreover, organizing the team not only requires selective recruiting. It will also be necessary to dismiss individuals who, upon being initially hired, turn out not to¯t perfectly into the team. However, only large, well-diversi¯ed¯rms can be taken to satisfy the assumption of risk-neutrality. In such¯rms the possibility to implement a selective human resource policy is then additionally limited by their "corporate culture" and by law 5 . These arguments suggest that entrepreneurial¯rms possess a comparative advantage in organizing ability-matched teams. For analytic tractability, the following analysis then assumes that the ability to select team members constitutes an exclusive characteristic of partnerships. There also exist¯rms in which managements act on behalf of pro¯t-maximizing ownerships. Such rms recruit randomly. They can draw from the remaining pool of professionals who do not found partnerships.
Suppose that individuals seeking employment in managed¯rms are char-acterized by abilities q 2 [q L ; q U ], with q U 5 q H . It is assumed that recruiting for each task in the¯rm represents an independent draw from the same pool of potential employees. Since abilities are distributed uniformly, random recruiting by managed¯rms then implies that the expected quality of an employee in each task i, i = 1; :::; n, is given by Efq i¯qL < q i < q
Moreover, the respective expected pro¯t maximization problem can be stated as
where V now refers to the wage-income in managed¯rms. The¯rst-order conditions can then be obtained as
and
where the superscript "o" denotes the respective optimal values. According to (31), the capital rental payments account for the share ® of expected revenue. Thus, competition among managed¯rms yields
Substituting from (33) into (32) then implies
Hence,¯rm size now maximizes the function n[Efq j q L < q < q U g] n . In the case of managed¯rms which recruit randomly, the team size is determined by the "average" team member's ability. Using (31), (32) and (34), the second-order su±cient conditions are satis¯ed as well. The respective secondderivatives restate (12) to (15) Investigating the possibility of a separating competitive industry equilibrium, it can then be shown:
Proposition 4 Let individual preferences be characterized by risk-aversion. Also, the industry's professionals can only either¯nd employment in managed rms which recruit randomly, or found entrepreneurial¯rms with abilitymatched production teams. Then, if Y > rk ¤ (
) and the ability spread q H ¡q L in the population is su±ciently large, there always exists a separating competitive industry equilibrium. In equilibrium, individuals characterized by q 5q prefer to be employed by managed¯rms. At the same time, individuals with abilities q >q will found entrepreneurial¯rms.
Proof. Recall that q 2 [q L ; q H ], with 0 < q L < q H < 1. Hence, the case q = 0 is excluded. Neither managed nor entrepreneurial¯rms will take up production, if a single member of the team destroys output with certainty. Also, for q = 1, the revenue function exhibits increasing returns to¯rm size. Thus, there does not exist an optimal¯rm size. Again, this holds irrespective of¯rm-type.
Then, suppose that the whole industry would consist of entrepreneurial rms. As shown in the previous section, the expected partnership utility satis¯es EU (q;ñ(q);
Hence, a managed¯rm o®ering the wage-income w ¤ (q L ) would be able to attract individuals with abilities q = [q L ; q L + ±], with ± > 0. Employing n ¤ (q L ) of these individuals applying for jobs and investing k ¤ (q L ), it would then earn positive pro¯ts.
Thus, the industry cannot consist of entrepreneurial¯rms only. Intuitively, random recruiting does not imply a loss of the bene¯ts associated with ability-matching, if only a single ability-type is searching for a job in a managed¯rm. O®ering a certain wage-income then constitutes a competitive advantage of managed¯rm employment.
Next, note that there exists a maximum wage-income
) obtainable, if the whole industry consists only of managed¯rms. Also,
) exists and is equal to w ¤ (
). This wage-income requires investments of k ¤ (
). Thus, assuming that the exogenous income satis¯es Y > rk ¤ (
) implies that the maximum investment level of managed rms can be¯nanced out of personal funds, given that the ability spread in the population is also at its maximum.
Then, for every feasible investment level
for all q > 0. Focussing on the marginal entrepreneurial¯rm still to be founded, set q = q U . Jensen's inequality implies
If the whole industry consists only of managed¯rms, q U = q H . Then, recall that all expressions on the RHS of (36) 
Clearly, the RHS of this inequality is positive. Moreover, Y > rk ¤ (
) can now be veri¯ed to imply that the investment level associated with dominant partnerships is always individually feasible. Thus, it has been proved that there exits an ability level q < q H such that EU (q;ñ(q);
) and the ability spread (q H ¡ q L ) is su±ciently large. Given these two assumptions, the industry cannot consist of managed¯rms only.
Concluding, there must then also exist an ability levelq 2 (q L ; q H ] such that EU (q;ñ(q);k(q)) = U (Y +V o (q)). This follows from (29). Also, (29) implies that EU (q;ñ(q);k(q)) > U (Y + V o (q)), for q >q, and EU (q;ñ(q);k(q)) < U (Y + V o (q)), for q <q. This proves the separating equilibrium property c) ofq as required by the de¯nition provided in section 2 above.
Q.E.D.
INSERT FIGURE 1. Figure 1 illustrates the properties of this separating equilibrium. The two conditions noted in the propositions are jointly su±cient for its existence. Also, they are not independent of each other, since
). This is due to the fact that @k o (q U )=@q U > 0. In particular, if the labor pool contains individuals characterized by rather low abilities, k ¤ (
) constitutes an upper bound on the capital required by managed¯rms. This follows from
), for all q U < 1. The feasibility constraint Y > rk o (q) which must hold in equilibrium may therefore be less restrictive than suggested by the proposition.
Moreover, consider the legal liability rules of real-world partnerships. Feasibility actually only implies that the total private wealth of the group of rm founders must be su±cient to cover the cost of capital associated with an integrated production. Thus, the restrictive nature of the feasibility constraint to some extent only re°ects the theoretically interesting assumption that individuals share an identical degree of risk-aversion and level of private wealth.
The assumption of a su±ciently large ability spread within the industry's pool of professionals then further requires that di®erentiation by means of founding entrepreneurial¯rms must be bene¯cial. Obviously, the productive loss associated with ability pooling is relatively small, if there is only little variance of abilities across the population. Again judging the real-world implications, the ability spread within one profession should be related to the novelty of the production technology. If the industry is highly innovative, professional education can be guessed to be less standardized. Thus, it allows for more individual variance.
Finally, suppose the assumption that professionals can only¯nd employment in the particular industry is relaxed. More attractive outside employment opportunities then reduce the size of the entrepreneurial segment in the industry. If an increasing number of low-ability professionals can¯nd more pro¯table employment elsewhere, q L increases. Hence, ceteris paribus V o (q U ) increases for all q U > q L . Thus, the migration of low-ability individuals into other industries decreases the relative attractiveness of entrepreneurial activity in the industry under consideration.
With respect to uniqueness and e±ciency of the separating equilibrium, the following can further be shown:
Proposition 5 Suppose the conditions noted in Proposition 4 are satis¯ed. Generally, the existence of multiple separating competitive industry equilibria cannot be excluded. Let the possible equilibrium separating ability levels be denotedq k , with k = 1; :::; K for K = 1. Then, the unique e±cient equilibrium is characterized byq = maxfq k g.
Proof.
Given that the conditions noted in Proposition 4 are satis¯ed there exists at least oneq 2 (q L ; q H ) such that EU (q;ñ(q);k(q)) = U (Y + V o (q)) and EU (q;ñ(q);
by virtue of (29) and (24). From
Inserting from (40) into (38) then reveals that @EU(q;ñ(q);k(q)) @q
The separating competitive equilibrium is necessarily unique, if (40) is greater than one for all q U 2 [q L ; q H ]. However, (40) can generally be greater than, equal to, or smaller than one. Hence, such a single-crossing property cannot be established. In particular, the uniqueness of the separating competitive industry equilibrium can be seen to require speci¯c assumptions concerning the properties of U (¢).
Hence, suppose that there exist multiple intersections of the two functions
, with k = 1; ::; K and K = 1. Utilizing the arguments provided in the proof of Proposition 4, K must be an odd number then. Let the potential equilibrium separating ability levelsq k be ordered such thatq 1 < q 2 <q 3 < ::: <q K . Again the arguments used in the proof of Proposition 4 then imply that EU (q;ñ(q);k(q))
Note that only the ability levelsq`, with`= 1; 3; 5; ::; K, may therefore characterize a separating competitive industry equilibrium as de¯ned above. This follows, since each of these abilityq`levels satis¯es EU (q`;ñ(q`);k(q`))
The intersections characterized byq`0, with`0 = f2; 4; ::; (K ¡ 1)g also satisfy condition b) of the de¯nition of a competitive industry equilibrium. Moreover, by construction,
o (q`0)), for at least some q 2 (q`0;q`0 +1 ]. The¯rst inequality implies that some groups of current employees of managed¯rms would rather found ability-matched partnerships. According to the second inequality, the members of some current partnerships would rather join managed¯rms. Thus, condition c) of the de¯nition provided in section 2 is violated forq`0, with 0 = f2; 4; ::; (K ¡ 1)g. Finally, since EU (q;ñ(q);k(q)) is monotonically increasing in q and U (Y + V o (q U )) is monotonically increasing in q U , its is obvious thatq K characterizes the unique e±cient separating competitive industry equilibrium.
INSERT FIGURE 2.
Figure 2 illustrates the case with three intersections of EU (q;ñ(q);k(q)) and U (Y + V o (q U )). The ability levelsq 1 andq 3 obviously constitute possible separating competitive equilibria. Given that these allocations are established, condition c) of the equilibrium de¯nition above is satis¯ed. In contrast, given that q = q U =q 2 , the current members of some partnerships characterized by ability levels greater thanq 2 would prefer to become employed by a managed¯rm. Moreover, they can join such¯rms by simply entering the pool of potential employees.
Furthermore, the equilibrium characterized by q = q U =q 3 paretodominates the equilibrium attained at q = q U =q 1 . Interestingly, the e±-cient equilibrium thus minimizes the entrepreneurial activity in the economy. This is due to the fact that, at the same time, it maximizes the amount of risk-shifting in the industry, while still o®ering su±cient incentives to found dominant partnerships.
Yet, it should be noted that moving the industry from the ine±cient equilibrium at q = q U =q 1 to the e±cient equilibrium at q = q U =q 3 requires coordinated actions of partnerships. In particular, all partnerships characterized by team abilities q 2 [q 1 ;q 3 ) would have to coordinate to simultaneously join managed¯rms. However, such behavior is not consistent with competition among partnerships.
Concluding comments
Obviously, the analysis does not exclusively apply to particular new industries. Rather, it models the trade-o® between the comparative advantage of entrepreneurial groups in organizing team-production and the implied necessity to incur the project risk. Both issues constitute re-occurring themes in the literature on entrepreneurship. Thus, the recent experience of the emergence of a so-called "New Economy" only provides an example. The respective new technologies appear to be characterized by positive complementarities between the¯rm's human assets. Utilizing the O-Ring production theory, such complementarities can be directly linked to reductions in the project risk.
"New Economy"¯rms rather typically emerge as spin-o®s led by former high-pro¯le employees of integrated¯rms. The assumption of risk-aversion thus appears straightforward. In addition, one of two jointly su±cient conditions for the existence of a separating equilibrium then highlights a possibly existing¯nancial constraint. The private wealth of an entrepreneur must su±ce to cover the per-capita investment costs associated with integrated production, given that team quality equals the average ability in the total population of professional specialists.
Recent discussions often refer to a perceived "volatility" of "New Economy"¯rms. Section 3 has shown that a small change in the production technology or market environment which increases the attractiveness of employment in "Old Economy" managed¯rms implies a rather signi¯cant reduction in the number of entrepreneurial spin-o®s. Moreover, while there always exists a unique e±cient equilibrium, multiple equilibria cannot be ruled out. This introduces still another source of volatility with respect to the emergence of entrepreneurial¯rms. Following a shock, the industry may attain a di®erent separating equilibrium. If the new equilibrium is characterized by a higher (lower) separating ability level, the average size of the entrepreneurial rm increases (decreases) and the number of such¯rms decreases (increases) rather drastically.
Finally, recall¯gure 1 which for convenience depicts a situation with only one such equilibrium. This equilibrium -and also every other equilibrium which may arise -appears inherently unstable. In equilibrium, the human resource managements of "Old Economy"¯rms can assess that the entrepreneurial partnerships consist of professionals characterized by superior ability. In fact, the size of an entrepreneurial¯rm constitutes a perfect signal of team-quality. Since teams in such¯rms are homogeneous, a possibly existing problem of asymmetric information concerning individual abilities is therefore completely resolved. Thus, as discussed by Holmstr¿m and Kaplan [2001] , entrepreneurial spin-o®s may actually serve as a purely transitory "discovery process". Given the advantage of risk-sharing in managed rms, this process provides incentives for re-integration. Yet, this argument actually requires more than merely a solution to the informational problem. As noted by Bhid ¶ e [2000, 324] the "corporate cul`2 f1; ::;n g g. Since the capital rental rate is the same for the two¯rms g and f , a second set of necessary conditions yields
consider¯rms of a particular type t -assuming that there exist t = 1; :::;T 
